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“Desiderio in Search of a Master”: Desire and the Quest for Recognition 
in Angela Carter’s The Infernal Desire Machines of Doctor Hoffman 




This paper will address how the interpersonal relations depicted in Angela Carter’s novel 
The Infernal Desire Machines of Doctor Hoffman are represented as affecting the 
development of the self. Focusing upon the first-person narrator and his love-object, it 
will consider the manner in which the characters are portrayed as detecting elements of 
themselves within the people that they desire, and look at how sexual attraction and 
romantic love are shown to influence the dynamics of identity-forming encounters. 
During the course of the discussion, the paper will examine the manner in which the 
events of the narrative enact and interrogate philosophical ideas concerning the relations 
between the self and the other. More specifically, it will concentrate upon the ways in 
which Carter’s novel engages the work of Hegel in a detailed and productive 
conversation. 
Beginning with a brief outline of Hegel’s famous account of the interaction 
between the lord and the bondsman, the article will go on to consider the novel’s 
treatment of the tension between a compulsion to identify with the other and a conflicting 
urge to dominate him or her. What constitutes an ideal other for Carter’s characters, and 
how does this intersect with feelings of desire? What obstacles are shown to hinder, in the 
theorist Jessica Benjamin’s words, the process of “recognizing the other as an equivalent 
centre of experience” (28)? This paper will consider how the novel’s treatment of 
Hegelian themes works to illuminate the German philosopher’s ideas, before concluding 
with an account of the unrealised possibility of recognition that haunts Carter’s text.  
 
Master, Slave and the Self-Reflecting Gaze  
 
First published in 1972, The Infernal Desire Machines of Doctor Hoffman is a surreal, 
picaresque novel which takes the form of an autobiography. It focuses on the adventures 
  
of a character named Desiderio, and depicts both his sexual obsession with the shape-
shifting Albertina, and his journey through a world in which time and space have become 
mutable. In the text, the forces of reason and desire are at war, and Desiderio is instructed 
to assassinate “the diabolical Dr Hoffman” (Carter 11). Hoffman is the “great patriarchal 
Forbidder turned Permitter, the one who sets libido ‘free’” (Sage 34), and it is he who has 
unleashed desire upon the city. However, as he nears the end of his first-person narrative, 
Desiderio realises that the true purpose of his quest was never to kill the enemy leader. 
Instead, it was to find a person worthy of his respect, and he suggests that his journey 
should have been entitled “Desiderio in Search of a Master” (Carter 190). If to seek a 
master implies a longing to be controlled and dominated, then it is perhaps important to 
examine why the protagonist finds this so desirable.  
That Desiderio uses the term ‘master’ is significant for the purposes of this study, 
because the word is imbued with Hegelian connotations. The theory of lordship and 
bondage outlined in Phenomenology of Spirit is, after all, popularly referred to as the 
Master/Slave dialectic. In his discussion of self-consciousness, Hegel argues that, when 
the self first becomes aware of the existence of another being, it experiences both 
affirmation and anxiety. Upon realising that this being has “an independent existence of 
its own” (Hegel 112), the self enjoys a moment of identification with the other. However, 
the self also becomes aware of itself as an inessential object before an autonomous 
individual’s gaze, and this provokes a desire to dominate and seek “the death of the 
other” in order to reassert the self (113). An intense struggle for supremacy ensues, after 
which the self and the other enter into a relationship of mutual dependence based upon 
asymmetrical power relations; the winner is henceforth the lord or master, whilst the loser 
exists as the bondsmen or slave. 
However, the master is more than simply a domineering figure who “holds the 
other in subjection” (Hegel 115), for only the figure of the master within Hegel’s 
dialectic is capable of providing satisfactory recognition. The nature of the relationship 
between master and slave means that “the action of the bondsman is impure and 
unessential” (116), for he is condemned to perpetual “thinghood” (115). As such, “the 
object in which the lord has achieved his lordship has in reality turned out to be 
something quite different from an independent consciousness” (116 - 117). In other 
  
words, because the bondsman is not perceived as being human to the same extent as the 
lord, any power that the lord might have over him or her is rendered meaningless. The 
master thus remains uncertain “of his [sic] being-for-self as the truth of himself [sic]” 
(117, original emphasis). Conversely, due to his or her essential status within the 
dialectic, the lord is potentially able to offer “recognition proper” (116). The master 
could, in principle, grant the slave an image of the self through the eyes of a creditable 
other, and therefore represents the possibility of achieving true self-consciousness and 
self-certainty. 
We can, therefore, conceive of the object of Desiderio’s quest as more than just a 
leader; our protagonist is perhaps in search of a Hegelian lord capable of providing 
recognition. With this in mind, I would argue that the character of Albertina functions not 
only as the focus of Desiderio’s sexual desire, but also as the object of his quest for 
recognition. I now hope to demonstrate that despite, or rather because of, her close 
resemblance to the protagonist, Albertina is positioned as the ideal potential master. The 
novel repeatedly draws attention to the many similarities between Desiderio and his love-
object as they change throughout the narrative. Both are shown to have ‘exotic’ 
parentage, for example, and Desiderio wonders whether Albertina might, like himself, 
have descended from “certain of the forgotten Indians” (Carter 32). The protagonist and 
his beloved are also depicted as being similar in appearance, and Desiderio’s narrative 
voice recalls that, in his youth, he was “Albertina in the male aspect” (199). He remarks 
that “That is why I know I was beautiful when I was a young man. Because I know I 
looked like Albertina” (199). 
Albertina, so infinitely compelling and attractive to Desiderio, is seen by the 
narrator as an idealized, feminine version of himself.2 It might be argued that, in so far as 
she embodies both the other and the self, Albertina could be considered the perfect 
master. Hegelian theory provides a basis for this argument. Having been confronted by 
another independent entity, self-consciousness finds that “it has lost itself, for it finds 
itself as an other being” (Hegel 111, original emphasis). However, it must be 
remembered that in understanding the self through the eyes of the other, the self has also 
“superseded the other, for it does not see the other as an essential being, but in the other 
sees its own self” (111). In other words, the self supplants the other by projecting itself 
  
onto this separate self-consciousness at the very moment of identification and 
acknowledgement.  
Conversely, when the self receives recognition from the other in this manner, it is 
itself superseded. The very experience of being recognized might therefore be seen as a 
subtle form of subjugation which destabilizes identity because it involves the 
displacement of the self. However, in discovering a potential master who is also, 
fantastically, already the self, Desiderio manages to circumvent this issue. Should 
Albertina assume the role of the dominant and recognising partner in the Master/Slave 
dialectic, then Desiderio would be able to receive recognition without being truly 
superseded by the other, for this other is merely an alternative version of his self. 
One recurring image in The Infernal Desire Machines seems to operate as a 
commentary upon this complex power dynamic - the reflecting eye. When Desiderio first 
comes across a magical peep-show, he views an exhibit entitled “THE ETERNAL 
VISTAS OF LOVE” (Carter 45). He recalls that “all I could see were two eyes looking 
back at me” (45), and goes on to add that “in the pupils I could see, reflected in two discs 
of mirror, my own eyes, very greatly magnified” (45). This exhibit is enacted by our hero 
and his beloved, and reprised throughout the text. For example, the narrator recalls of 
Albertina that “I would gaze at her for hours together, as though I were feeding on her 
eyes. And, as I remember, she, too, would gaze at me” (187). He even goes so far as to 
state that “we saw the events of the war in which we were enlisted on opposite sides only 
by the light of one another’s faces” (136). The connection between this repeated image of 
a reciprocated, desiring gaze that reflects the self, and Hegel’s notion of a type of 
consciousness achieved via viewing the self through the “middle term” of the other 
(Hegel 112), is obvious. This association highlights a certain privileging of the self which 
can occur in recognition. 
Because it is the self’s own gaze which becomes the focus of recognition here, the 
other is effaced and rendered merely a mirror in which the narcissistic self can view 
itself. In this situation, as Benjamin notes, “the pleasure of mutuality between two 
subjects is reduced to its function of stabilizing the self, not of enlarging our awareness of 
the outside or of recognizing others as animated by independent, though similar, feelings” 
(33). Because the importance of appreciating the freestanding identity of the other is 
  
obscured by the desire to superimpose oneself upon this other, the perceived possibility 
of recognition diminishes. If one cannot suppress the desire to insist upon accentuating 
the essential nature of the self at the expense of the otherness of the other, and if one 
cannot conceive of the possibility that one’s own self-conscious is inessential for discrete 
and different beings, then one will find oneself unable to conceive of a reciprocal 
moment of recognition. The hope that one will be acknowledged reduces in response to 
the self’s egotistical closed-mindedness, and as one asserts oneself with mounting self-
importance, anxiety about the impossibility of recognition increases exponentially. 
The projection of the self upon the other sometimes takes the form of physical 
violence in the novel, and combative power play is depicted as a central element of the 
relationship between Albertina and Desiderio. During the period of nebulous time,3 when 
the couple are prey to their own unconscious fantasies, Desiderio recalls being convinced 
that they would not escape with their lives: “if we were the victims of unleashed, 
unknown desires, then die we must, for as long as those desires existed, we would finish 
by killing one another” (Carter 191). Indeed, the decisive encounter of their relationship 
is a violent and extended brawl, in which they wrestle “for possession of the knife as 
passionately as if for the possession of each other” (216). This fight recalls Hegel’s “life-
and-death struggle” (Hegel 114), the results of which establish the positions of the two 
individuals within the Master/Slave dialectic. However, whilst Hegel’s characters reach 
an agreement, Carter’s ultimately take this struggle to its bloody conclusion.  
By illogically insisting that the potential master be wholly the self, and in 
demanding an unreciprocated recognition that would efface the other, the lovers are 
gripped by stasis. Desiderio and Albertina remain, with varying degrees of literality, 
forever at the instant of attempting to destroy one another and re-establish the self-
certainty which the first realisation of the existence of otherness disrupted. If one strips 
the metaphor of a fight to obtain recognition of its literal implications, however, and 
ignores the physical dangers endured by Desiderio and Albertina, then a 
conceptualisation of the quest for recognition as a manner of ongoing struggle loses many 
of its dystopic overtones. Indeed, a perpetually unfinished but endlessly affirmative 
practice of remaining receptive to the other, in the hope of initiating a process of 
becoming both the recognizer and the recognized, could be read as an ethical conception 
  
of love. Carter could thus be perceived as pessimistically misrepresenting the possibilities 
within an encounter between self-consciousnesses in a field of social relations that is 
influenced by asymmetrical power positions. However, Carter’s text introduces two 
major problems into a positive conceptualisation of this desire-fuelled Hegelian 
encounter – misrecognition and overly-narrow acknowledgement. 
 
Misrecognition and the Eternal Vistas of Love  
 
As discussed above, neither of the lovers is truly able to see the other because of the 
nature of the self-reflecting gaze of desire. This mesmerizing gaze is shown to obscure 
the person desired, by projecting, over him or her, a self incapable of acknowledging any 
self-consciousness but its own. In considering the other, Desiderio and Albertina are 
confronted only with mediated versions of themselves. As Albertina notes, this locates 
desire as “a perpetual journey that does not go through space, an endless oscillating 
motion that remains unmoved” (Carter 202). The stasis produced by misrecognition - that 
is, by a form of recognition that, compromised by the concerns of the self, does not truly 
allow for the otherness of a separate being - is shown to be all one can achieve in relation 
to the beloved. 
Perhaps this misrecognition can be related to Desiderio’s claim that “Love is the 
synthesis of dream and actuality” (Carter 202). As Slavoj Žižek suggests,  
 
“Any contact with a real, flesh-and-blood other, any sexual pleasure that 
we find in touching another human being, is not something evident, but 
something inherently traumatic, and can be sustained only in so far as 
this other enters the subject’s fantasy frame” (49).  
 
A sexual relationship, then, “has to be screened through some fantasy” in order to 
function (49). We have no access to the ‘real’ of our beloveds and, because we must rely 
on our own fantasies to facilitate the creation of intimate bonds, the love-object is 
necessarily a synthesis of the other and the self. Albertina admits as much when she 
informs her lover that she has never fully been an entity in her own right: “all the time 
  
you have known me, I’ve been maintained in my various appearances only by the power 
of your desire” (Carter 204). Albertina, as the reader experiences her, is partially “the 
emanation of Desiderio’s desire, and depends for her existence on the story he tells” 
(Jordan 209). 
Of course, in a post-Kantian and post-Lacanian world,4 it is widely accepted that 
no individual has access to any version of reality that is separate from the mediation of 
his or her own mind. In fact, an acceptance that one will always see the self reflected in 
one’s own experiences of others is arguably a culturally dominant notion in the 
contemporary age. This fact need not pose an intractable challenge to the possibility of 
initiating the process of recognition. If one works to remind oneself that the other views 
the self through a similar filter of subjectivity, and remembers that one’s own opinions 
are not universal, then a moment of identification with the other can occur at the very 
moment that one is forced to confront difference.  
It is not impossible, then, to incorporate the supposed problem of misrecognition 
into theories of Hegelian acknowledgement. However, it is easy to understand why the 
novel includes no such act of incorporation. Opening up a space within one’s cognitive 
landscape for the acceptance of epistemological and attitudinal difference may involve a 
self-aware intellectual effort that would be quite out of place in Carter’s “kingdom of the 
instantaneous” (Carter 18), where the world and its cities are “no longer the conscious 
production of humanity” (18). After all, as Elaine Jordan has noted, the action of The 
Infernal Desire Machines is generated “from the fragmented and unrecognised elements 
of Desiderio’s desire as much as from his deliberate – if sceptical – service of rationality” 
(206). I would argue that the ethical act of acknowledging that both self and other possess 
viewpoints that are similarly contingent would be wholly anomalous in a narrative that is 
persistently influenced by the violent and unconscious fantasies of the characters. 
The text also raises the issue of over-narrowness in relation to Desiderio and 
Albertina’s attempt at recognition. Carter’s exploration of the reflecting gaze produces a 
peculiar version of the Master/Slave dialectic. Not only do the huge pupils of the peep-
show allow Desiderio to gaze at his own eyes, but, as he recollects, “my own pupils, in 
turn, reflected the false eyes before me while these reflections again reflected those 
reflections” (Carter 45). The exhibit, as a metaphor for the quest for recognition, 
  
envisages the self as progressing from being an inessential object for the other, to 
becoming the self of the other through identification, and back again in a near-
instantaneous manner. This perpetually circular process of realisation and identification is 
akin to a feedback loop, which produces only “the motionless tautology of: ‘I am I’” 
(Hegel 105). The peep-show, offering as it does “a model of eternal regression” (Carter 
45), represents a perpetually oscillating gaze which is exchanged in a similarly ceaseless 
manner between the two lovers, and which, because of its very endlessness, works to 
prevent all other forms of seeing. 
The exhibit is explicitly connected with the relationship between Desiderio and 
Albertina, for our narrator, recalling a moment of conversation with his love-object, 
remembers how “In the looking glasses of her eyes, I saw […] my entire being whirl 
apart and reassemble itself innumerable times” (Carter 202). That this relationship should 
be so associated with an exhibit entitled “THE ETERNAL VISTAS OF LOVE” is telling 
(45), for such a phrase emphasises that Desiderio’s encounter with Albertina offers only 
the narrowest of views. Blinkered by the vista of the reverberating gaze of attempted 
recognition, Desiderio can look only at Albertina. The focused nature of his gaze limits 
his peripheral vision, and desire becomes necessarily exclusive.  
This manner of gazing finds its ultimate expression in the “love pens” of Dr 
Hoffman’s laboratory (Carter 213), where numerous heterosexual pairs engage in 
continual sexual intercourse in order to fuel the desire machines responsible for 
disrupting time and space. These couples remain “so engrossed in their vital work they do 
not even notice” those around them (214). Desiderio recalls this disconcerting passivity, 
and notes that the bloody fracas resulting from his eventual rejection of Albertina barely 
disturbs “the willed oblivion of the love slaves” (216). In response to the noise of the 
brawl, he reports, they merely “bucked and thrust less violently, and one or two moved 
their eyes as far as they could without moving their heads to watch me” (216). Even after 
the gunshots, when the corpses of Albertina and her father lie upon the laboratory floor, 
“none of [the love slaves] seemed to observe this spectacle for they still seemed half-
blinded” (217). Their intensely narrow gaze inflicts a single-minded stasis, which 
excludes the rest of the world in order to focus solely upon the sexual partner. 
  
The ceaseless oscillation of the look of love, involved as it is in a problematic 
attempt to receive acknowledgement from the object of one’s desires, risks destroying the 
possibility of recognition beyond a narrow vista. This is further illustrated by the 
protagonist’s experiences with the figure of the Count. Desiderio notes that this 
extraordinary character “had a passionate conviction he was the only significant 
personage in the world” (Carter 123), and that “It was impossible to converse with him 
for he had no interest in anyone but himself and he offered his companion only a series of 
monologues” (124). The Count is interested only in creating a situation where he can 
secure recognition for himself without having to acknowledge the other; his self-
regarding nature is to some extent an attempt to enact an impossibly narrow recognition 
which does not even move beyond the self. 
This situation leads to the existence of the Chief – a fantastical self-other who 
physically embodies the Count’s self-involved desires. However, even after the 
introduction of an ostensibly autonomous self-consciousness which the Count feels able 
to deem significant, his quest for recognition from this ideal other maintains an excessive 
narrowness which recalls the image of the vista. This is evidenced by one particular 
encounter between Desiderio and the Count, who, taken up with his own identity and that 
of the Chief, declares “I am alone. I and my shadow fill the universe” (148). In the textual 
world of actualised desires, this destructive self-absorption almost obliterates the novel’s 
protagonist and his love-object. Desiderio remarks that “I felt myself instantly negated. 
To my horror, I discovered I immediately grew thinner and less solid” (148). In only 
acknowledging the existence of one other discrete self-consciousness, the Count almost 
condemns Desiderio and Albertina to “that cold night of non-being” (148). 
The bond between the self and the desired other is shown to be passionate and all-
consuming, but if the perpetual becoming of the process of recognition occurs only 
within the eternal vistas of exclusive attachments, then recognition fails to achieve any 
significance beyond this bond. It becomes devoid of wider meaning, and the myriad of 
others that one encounters in social relations fail to initiate any such quest to 
acknowledge and be acknowledged. If such a process is brought into being only within a 
monogamous sexual or romantic relationship, then it exists merely as a form of politically 
ineffectual stasis.  
  
 
Conclusion: Autobiography, Ambiguity and Carter’s Positive Thesis 
 
Benjamin argues that “recognition begins with the other’s confirming response, which 
tells us that we have created meaning, had an impact, revealed an intention” (33). This 
notion of provoking a particular desired effect and producing readable signs seems to 
position the self as a manner of artist or author. Benjamin’s statement therefore suggests 
that Desiderio’s narrative, as a self-aware act of self-documentation, might be related to 
the character’s quest for acknowledgement. Throughout The Infernal Desire Machines, 
the Desiderio of the textual present is, as it were, watching the Desiderio of the narrative 
past. There is therefore a marked split between the narrator and the journeying figure 
whose adventures are recounted. Desiderio himself admits this divide, declaring “I was a 
great hero in my time though now I am an old man and no longer the ‘I’ of my own 
story” (Carter 14). 
Desiderio, as he narrates his tale, is very much aware of himself as an individual 
leaving a legacy. He sees himself already as “a commemorative statue” (Carter 14), and 
he repeatedly mentions that the authorized version of his story can be found “in the 
history books” (208). However, the narrative that constitutes the novel is, to some extent, 
an attempt to dispute the accepted narrative which renders Desiderio a hero. The 
narrating protagonist is at work throughout the text subverting his reputation, and 
revealing facts which have thus-far been concealed from his public. For example, he 
divulges the manner in which he “killed the Doctor - that is, unintentionally” (217), and 
notes that his attack upon the laboratory technician lacked any element of “heroic 
struggle” (218). Desiderio suggests that the ignoble truth regarding his victory over the 
enemy will indicate to his reader that he does “not deserve to be a hero” (217). He further 
emphasizes that his reputation is unearned by presenting himself as apathetic and 
opportunistic:  
 
I became one of the founders of the new constitution - largely from the 
negative propulsion of my own inertia for, once I was placed and 
honoured on my plinth, I was not the man to climb down again, saying: 
‘But I am the wrong man!’ for I felt that, if what I had done had turned 
  
out for the common good, I might as well reap what benefits I could 
from it. (220 - 221)  
 
In light of this insistence upon filling in the fissures of history and foregrounding 
his inadequacies, Desiderio’s narrative could be interpreted as functioning as an attempt 
at self-disclosure before the eyes of a future reader. Without his account, history would 
continue to position him as an active and independent hero. However, Desiderio feels that 
this would be an act of misrecognition, for in attributing to him the status of an 
autonomous self-consciousness, history would be offering him recognition based upon a 
skewed and partial understanding of his actions. His narrative is an attempt to rectify this 
situation, for in attempting to disclose the reality of his actions and experiences, 
Desiderio is working to enable a more complete understanding and a more satisfactory 
recognition. 
The quest to obtain recognition which takes place during Desiderio’s journey 
fails, prompting him to question whether “all the potential masters the world held for me 
were to be revealed as nothing but monsters or charlatans” (Carter 213), and his 
community has recreated him according to a myth of his heroism which he believes to be 
false. However, his narrative, displayed as it is for the eyes of a multiplicity of future 
others, enables the quest to continue. As Paul de Man has noted, certain theories 
regarding life-writing suggest that “the identity of autobiography is not only 
representational and cognitive but contractual” (174), and that the reader becomes “the 
policing power in charge of verifying the authenticity of the signature” (174). Desiderio 
might be forgiven, then, for turning to a reading public for recognition, for such theories 
place the reader in a position of “transcendental authority” (174), from which he or she 
can judge the author. The reader thus represents a potential master, and the hope of a 
recognising other to come.  
However, any notion of a recognition that is induced by the full disclosure of the 
self is an illusion, for any such disclosure will always be imperfect and incomplete. The 
nebulous and fluid nature of the self means that there will necessarily be an excess which 
escapes any attempt at narration, and this is indeed a problem that Desiderio encounters. 
It is suggested that, in attempting to “unravel my life as if it were so much knitting and 
pick out from that tangle the single, original thread of my self” (Carter 11), he betrays the 
  
nature of his experience. After all, he states that when he recalls his journey, events 
“seem to happen all at once, in a kind of fugue of experience” (13), not in the linear 
manner in which he recounts his tale. Narrative thus functions in the novel not as an 
expository act of transparent representation, but as an act of violence invested with sense-
giving properties. It does not allow for the full and absolute revelation of the self which 
Desiderio appears to consider necessary in order to circumvent the threat of 
misrecognition.  
Besides being unfeasible, such reliance upon an autobiographical text to disclose 
the ‘truth’ of one’s identity also disregards some of the possibilities inherent within the 
positioning of the self as a form of author. These possibilities in fact depend upon the 
failures of narrative and the problems surrounding sense-production which Desiderio’s 
attempt at self-revelation seeks to elide. Benjamin’s discussion of recognition views the 
other’s validating response to the self’s utterances as foundational to mutual 
acknowledgement. Recognition begins when meaningful communication with the other 
occurs, and the self enjoys the satisfaction of seeing its intentions understood. However, 
it is worth remembering that every utterance brings with it the risk of misunderstanding, 
for an excess of meaning and a multiplicity of possible interpretations is potentially 
present within any linguistic act. Indeed, the very fact that the process of 
acknowledgement is initiated by the palpable satisfaction of seeing the desired purpose of 
a linguistic act understood is testament to the perpetual danger that one will be 
misinterpreted. 
The appearance of linguistic transparency which triggers affirmative mutual 
recognition for Benjamin is therefore precarious. The self may well operate as a manner 
of author, but because one can never fully contain the response of the reader, one’s texts 
might inadvertently signify in undesired ways, and this textual ambiguity perpetually 
disrupts intention. Just as Carter’s novel has been said to revel in “shamelessly exploiting 
sci-fi B-movie conventions for serious aesthetic and ideological purposes” and  “brazenly 
appropriating literary images cherished by British culture” (Bonca 57), so too can 
identities be violated by a near-infinite range of unforeseen readings. I believe that it is in 
the failure to precisely limit the reading of a text/utterance/self that the possibility of 
satisfactory recognition might be detected. When one becomes aware of one’s inability to 
  
control and exhaust signifying practices, when one realises the limits of authorship, 
difference is foregrounded. 
 The interpreting other, upon whom one depends for recognition, can thus no 
longer be positioned as a passive, inessential recipient of the self, or viewed merely as 
another version of the self. Nor can this other be held up as akin to the figure of the 
master, because, in this situation, he or she cannot reasonably seek to be the only 
essential party in the interaction. The other’s role in interpreting and communicating 
within the act of reading or conversing relies upon an acceptance of, and receptivity to, 
the self who is the other. Both self and other are engaged in a reciprocal attempt at 
intersubjective interaction which acknowledges the volatility and risk inherent within this 
attempt. Once acknowledged, then, the uncertainty regarding the success of 
communication confronts the individual with the otherness of the other, and the 
conditions for recognition are in place. 
That such acceptance of ambiguity is lacking from The Infernal Desire Machines 
is unsurprising for, as Linden Peach has noted, Carter’s world of unconscious desires 
only “gives way, and free reign, to exploitation and domination” (110). It is enmeshed 
not in attempts to forge reciprocal connections away from the power dynamic of the 
Master/Slave dialectic, but in endeavours to achieve recognition from the object of desire 
without compromising self-certainty. The text is haunted by the unrealised possibility of 
mutual recognition as embodied by Albertina, the lost other, to whom the narrative is 
dedicated with “insatiable tears” (Carter 14). The novel shows us that a will to be 
recognized, combined with a disinterest in recognizing anything other than the self and an 
inability to look beyond one’s love-object, leads to violence, frustration and 
dissatisfaction. Whether one seeks a master or seeks to be one, recognition is withheld. It 
is, I would argue, in the margins of the novel, in the unrepresented attempt to embrace 
ambiguity and accept one’s inability to possess absolute knowledge and vision, that 







 I would like to thank Mark Currie for all his helpful suggestions, and Diarmuid Hester for his invaluable 
support and advice. 
2
 The role of narcissism in the novel is closely related to the concerns of this essay, but I unfortunately do 
not have space to do justice to this issue here. 
3 Cornel Bonca offers this definition of Carter’s concept: “Nebulous Time means the chaos of time and 
space, where desire mingles with actuality and dreams swerve to nightmare in a flash; it's a sort of Lacanian 
Imaginary made flesh” (60). 
4
 It would be possible, and productive, to read Carter’s novel alongside Lacanian ideas regarding the big 





Benjamin, Jessica.  Like Subjects, Love Objects: Essays on Recognition and Sexual 
     Difference.  New Haven: Yale UP, 1995. 
 
Bonca, Cornel.  “In Despair of the Old Adams: Angela Carter's The Infernal Desire  
     Machines of Dr. Hoffman.”  Review of Contemporary Fiction.  14.3 (1994): 56 – 62. 
 
Carter, Angela.  The Infernal Desire Machines of Doctor Hoffman.  New York: Penguin,  
     1994. 
 
De Man, Paul.  “Autobiography as De-facement.”  Deconstruction: A Reader.  Ed.  
     Martin McQuillan.  Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2000. 171-74 
 
Hegel, G. W. F.  Phenomenology of Spirit.  Trans. A. V. Miller.  Oxford: Oxford UP,  
     1977. 
 
Jordan, Elaine.  “The Dangerous Edge.”  Flesh and the Mirror: Essays on the Art of  
     Angela Carter.  Ed. Lorna Sage.  London: Virago, 1994. 189-215. 
 
Peach, Linden.  Angela Carter.  Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998. 
 
Sage, Lorna.  Angela Carter.  Plymouth: Northcote House, 1994. 
 
Žižek, Slavoj.  How to Read Lacan.  London: Granta, 2006. 
 
                                                 
 
